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You know the old saying, ‘never judge a book 
by its cover’? When I received this volume I 
was captivated by the image that takes centre 
stage on the front: activists dressed in green 
boiler suits and baseball caps holding a 
multilingual ‘peace’ banner heading up a 
march, with smaller placards and the massed 
banners of unions dimly visible in the 
distance behind them. Given the picture, and 
the book’s title, I expected to find myself 
reading stories of coalitions between policy-
makers, practitioners and activists from 
around the planet, all working in the common 
cause of a more equal and sustainable world. 
What I found, instead, was an extremely 
challenging and thought-provoking dialogue 
between academics (principally political 
philosophers) and policy commentators, each 
grappling with the development of a policy-
literate philosophy of social justice. 
 
When introducing this edited collection of 
papers, the editors note that ‘in the context of 
a globalising world social justice is becoming 
more complex both theoretically and in 
practice’. They point out that political 
philosophers have a tendency to construct 
ever more elaborate theories to try to explain 
and illuminate this complexity, but that their 
theories can be remote from the policy and 
practice context in which social justice and 
injustices are lived, contested, articulated and 
addressed. Policy-makers, argue the editors, 
may by contrast be guilty of producing 
policies the logic of which is at best naïve and 
lacking in a convincing theoretical rationale. 
In the view of the editors, this lack of cross-
disciplinary and cross-sector dialogue, where 
the respective discourses of academics and 
policy-makers are allowed to slide past each 
other, produces a fuzziness from which it can 
be difficult to challenge with appropriate 
conviction the claims of politicians at all 
points of the political spectrum to be the 
champions of social justice. In response, the 
editors emphasise the importance of 
promoting sophisticated engagement within 
and across academic disciplines and policy 
and practice communities. The aim of this 
volume is to contribute to such engagement.  
 
As might be expected, many of the 
contributions take the work of John Rawls as 
their starting point. Rawls is commonly 
associated with a distributional view of social 
justice, and his ‘difference’ principle that 
social and economic inequalities should be 
arranged to benefit the least advantaged has 
been a dominating idea in discussion of social 
justice since the publication of A Theory of 
Justice in 1971. In his chapter, political 
philosopher Jonathan Wolff usefully points 
out that, for Rawls, this principle was 
secondary to his ‘liberty’ principle, that every 
individual should have the right to the most 
extensive freedoms compatible with similar 
freedoms for all, thus locating social justice 
within a debate about rights and liberty. Wolff 
draws on the work of Sen and Dworkin to 
provide a liberal pluralist critique of Rawls: 
first, that his difference principle elides the 
question of what causes disadvantage, and 
masks the possibility that some individuals 
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might be responsible for the condition in 
which they find themselves. Second, that it 
does not take adequate account of the fact that 
some people’s needs may be more expensive 
than others – for instance, the needs of 
profoundly disabled people for specialist 
equipment, medication and paid support. 
Using Dworkin, he suggests applying the idea 
of redistribution within a threefold grouping 
of factors that affect people’s life 
opportunities: ‘internal resources’ (such as 
strength and skill), ‘external resources’, 
including wealth and income, but also family 
support and social networks, and thirdly, the 
social and material structures within which 
these resources operate. There is an attraction 
in this analysis for educators. It is possible to 
envisage a redistributive role for teachers in 
which we are concerned to enable students to 
maximise their internal resources. Indeed, we 
could see ourselves as part of our students’ 
external resource bank. By separating 
resources from the structures within which 
they operate, educators might imagine 
ourselves as operating independently from 
those structures, and thus absolved of 
responsibility to engage seriously with them.  
 
A liberal analysis, however, is problematic for 
all sorts of reasons, not least because the 
pieces with which we play the game (to use 
Wolff’s analogy) are both shaped by the rules 
within which we play, and in turn are part of 
the production and reproduction of those 
rules. For me, a more fruitful analysis is 
provided by Iris Marion Young’s chapter, 
published posthumously. Working as I do in 
the field of dis/ability and education, I have 
long struggled with versions of what is 
sometimes called the 
redistribution/recognition dilemma. Put 
simply, redistributing resources often involves 
identifying and naming individuals as part of 
a disadvantaged group which deserves a 
greater share. The identifying and naming 
may not be done by the individual concerned 
and may lead to what Nancy Fraser calls 
misrecognition: for example when a child is 
diagnosed with a developmental disorder such 
as autism, and the diagnosis then colours how 
they are seen by themselves and others, and 
what opportunities are subsequently open to 
them. Many of the papers in this book look at 
aspects of this redistribution/recognition 
dilemma, considering how differences of 
many kinds shape what people are able to 
make of their lives. Young’s paper 
concentrates on what she identifies as two 
versions of a politics of difference: a politics 
of positional difference, and a politics of 
cultural difference. Crucially, she emphasises 
that both of these share a critique of 
difference-blind approaches, and start from 
the belief that a commitment to equality 
involves attending to difference and its 
consequences. A politics of positional 
difference argues sees people as unequally 
positioned through multiple structural axes of 
inequality that permeate both public and 
private spheres, producing unequal 
opportunities for self-development, unequal 
access to decision-making processes and an 
unequal share of material and relational 
resources such as money and respect. A 
politics of cultural difference focuses on 
disproportionate representation within the 
state and policy-making arenas by one, 
usually dominant, group, at the expense of 
marginalised groups, and with the 
consequence of reproducing marginalisation. 
Both politics have much in common. Young 
favours a politics of positional difference, 
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arguing that a politics of cultural difference 
does not make structural inequalities 
adequately visible, ignores civil society as a 
site for addressing injustice, and elevates 
particular group-based standards as 
normative, for example by attending to (male) 
religious leaders as representatives of their 
communities, uniquely able to speak for them. 
As an educator, I find Young’s analysis 
productive, in that it leads me towards a fuller 
understanding of the interrelationship of my 
work with the multiple and intersecting 
indices of difference along which students are 
positioned. Her analysis does not, however, 
lead towards a paralysing sense of inequality 
being ‘out there’ and beyond my remit: 
instead, she offers a cautiously optimistic 
view that education is potentially part of 
students’ identity projects, and that students 
are actively re-positioning themselves, albeit 
within structures not of their own making or 
choice.  
 
Given many politicians’ insistence that 
education is an important part of the 
‘solution’ of inequality, I was surprised that 
education policy barely appears in this book. 
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift’s chapter 
considers social justice and the family. They 
set out the problems Rawls had with the 
family, seeing it potentially as a problem for 
social justice, and an engine for the 
reproduction of inequality. This is a 
philosophical paper which examines the 
limitations of what parents ought to be able to 
do for their children. Brighouse and Swift 
argue that some of the actions parents take 
tend to produce unjust inequalities between 
children, but should be allowed on the 
grounds that they produce relational goods 
which it would be impossible (or at least very 
expensive) for society to try to emulate. I was 
not consistently convinced by where 
Brighouse and Smith chose to draw the line. 
For example, they argue that reading bedtime 
stories is allowable, and does not count as an 
unjust transmission of advantage in the way 
that leaving an inheritance would do. 
However, given what we know about the 
subtle ways in which educational advantage is 
transmitted, I was curious to know how far 
the bedtime stories principle could be taken. It 
could be argued that the parent who reads to 
their child transmits knowledge and 
dispositions which give the child an unfair 
advantage upon starting school. Would the 
bedtime stories principle extend to listening to 
a child read, discussing their homework over 
a leisurely evening meal, showing them 
appropriate research techniques for their 
coursework assignments, and other similar 
practices?  
 
Brighouse and Swift’s paper is followed by 
David Gordon’s consideration of children, 
policy and social justice. This is a more 
directly policy-focused analysis of child 
policy in the UK since 1997. Gordon 
describes a policy package ‘designed to 
achieve distributional justice for children 
through paid work for parents and some 
redistribution via cash benefits and improved 
services’. However, he goes on to argue that 
economic theories of distributional justice are 
unhelpful in that they take little regard of 
children, seeing them as citizens-in-waiting 
rather than citizens now. He claims that the 
economics of child poverty ‘are very simple 
and are entirely concerned with 
redistribution’. This may well be the case, but 
I found it extraordinary that in his paper he 
takes so little account of recognitional aspects 
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of child poverty, or what Lister, in her 
chapter, calls the psychological consequences 
of the Othering of the poor by the non-poor. It 
is useful that he points out the absence of 
children from Rawls’s work, but I was left 
thinking that a redistributive set of policies 
such as he appears to recommend would not, 
on their own, be equal to the challenge of 
challenging the conditions that produce child 
poverty.  
 
Inevitably, I have left a great deal out. In 
particular, several of the papers engage with 
Sen’s capabilities framework: in some papers, 
such as Paichaud’s overview of social policy, 
the stance is critical, whilst in other places, 
notably Adebowale’s examination of 
environmental justice, there is an emphasis on 
what a capabilities approach can offer. I have 
also left out Lister’s thought-provoking piece 
on social justice, voice and participation, 
despite having been intrigued by her proposal 
for ‘poverty awareness training’ for trainee 
social workers: working as I do in teacher 
education, I found myself wondering whether 
novice teachers might also benefit. However, 
a short review cannot do justice to this wide-
ranging collection.  
 
Would I recommend the book? The answer is 
a resounding yes. Once I let go of my initial 
misperceptions of what I might find between 
its covers, I found the collection absorbing. 
As an educator, I think there were some 
missed opportunities: the papers on children 
and families would have been stronger, I 
think, for some discussion of educational 
policies and practices, and there was 
remarkably little about community 
participation, with a silence about the part that 
informal education might play in participative 
democracy. Given a title which flags ‘diverse 
societies’ I also found the contributions rather 
UK-centric, with only one piece on 
globalisation, and many that were entirely 
based in the UK. These, perhaps, are 
relatively minor quibbles. As I read, I found 
myself forced to think about principles of 
social justice that I have come to take for 
granted. Several of the papers challenged me 
to come out of the groove into which my 
thinking has slipped over the past few years. 
Taken as a whole, it is fair to say that the 
volume is not an easy read, and needs 
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